Inconsistency And Common Sense: The Battle Of Basra

While analyzing the recent Basra confrontation in which the Iraqi Army confronted al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, the usual assessments are flowing from those associated with the anti-war movement. Take Juan Cole's recent essay that appeared in Salon Magazine (which is considered one of the more liberal publications) for instance.

Negativity permeates this article, much as we would expect from anyone that is critical of the Iraq War. I think this is mainly because Mr. Cole has made his name by communicating his belief that the current Iraq is a failed state. His commentary is well-known and respected in the circles that are against the war and to backtrack now would embarrass him greatly, in his academic circles. So, he continues to march, in the hope that he can influence perceptions of the outcome (if not the outcomes, themselves).

In his essay and speaking of the cease-fire, Mr. Cole expostulates:

By the time the cease-fire was called, al-Maliki had been bloodied after days of ineffective fighting and welcomed a way back from the precipice. Both Iran, which brokered the agreement, and al-Sadr, whose forces acquitted themselves well against the government, were strengthened.

As any person that is predisposed to certain biases, Mr. Cole communicates his assessment without regards to the analysis that directly contradicts his own. Take this recent column by Jack Kelly of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette into consideration, and you'll see what I mean.

Speaking of the cease fire called for by al-Sadr, he both poses and answers this question:

Why might Mr. al Sadr have sought a cease fire? "Sources in Basra tell TIME that there has been a large scale retreat in the oil-rich port city because of low morale and because ammunition is low due to the closure of the Iranian border," TIME reported Sunday.

"They were running short of ammunition, food and water," a U.S. military officer told Bill Roggio of the Long War Journal. "In short, (the Mahdi army) had no ability to sustain the effort."

That sure doesn't sound like al Sadr's forces were winning.

It doesn't sound that way to me, either.

How hard was the Mahdi Army getting hit? Mr. Kelly goes on to say (citing Mr Roggio):

His sources in the U.S. military tell him the Mahdi army was getting pounded, Bill Roggio said. "According to an unofficial tally... 571 Mahdi army fighters have been killed, 881 have been wounded, 490 have been captured, and 30 have surrendered over the course of seven days of fighting." "The U.S. and Iraqi military never came close to inflicting casualties at such a high rate during the height of major combat operations against al Qaida in Iraq during the summer and fall of 2007," he said. The Mahdi army has won by surviving, media analysts say. But it seems apparent the Mahdi army survived by quitting.

By lumping the number of casualties into one number (hoping the reader will not ask the pertinent questions that most critical thinkers would in this case), or by making a biased and inaccurate assessment (as Mr. Cole does in his essay), one thing rings true. Who you believe may be dependent on who you want to believe. If you want the Iraqi state to fail so you can blame George Bush, you will subscribe to typical media accounts and those essays put forth by people like Mr. Cole. if you want the truth, you will wait and read all accounts, before jumping to conclusions.

And just to take it a step further, I will pose another question for consideration in your pondering calculations: Why would al-Sadr offer a cease fire if the Mahdis were winning?

Common sense would dictate that the one that offers the cease fire is usually the one getting hit, the hardest. Wouldn't it?